Abstract: A specialist on China's energy industries surveys China's ambitious program for the expansion of nuclear energy, and how it may be reassessed in light of the disaster (earthquake and tsunami) that destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan in March 2011, spreading hazardous levels of radiation and forcing mass evacuations in that country. The author examines the rationale underlying the Chinese government's decision to rapidly increase China's nuclear power generation capacity, reviews the new plant construction targets in place immediately preceding the disaster in Japan, and analyzes Beijing's responses to it. Among the questions addressed are what alternatives China has for increasing "clean" power generation and whether nuclear power generation in that country poses greater risks overall than other means of power generation. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L940, O130, Q400, Q420, Q540. 1 figure, 2 tables, 95 references.
INTRODUCTION M
arch 11, 2011 will be recorded in history as the day when one of the five most powerful earthquakes in the world (since modern record-keeping began in 1900) occurred off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture in the Tohoku Region of northern Japan (about 220 km north of Tokyo). This 9.0-magnitude undersea earthquake was estimated to be the strongest to hit Japan, and the 10-meter tsunami caused by it was not only among the highest ever recorded, but among the most devastating. Within minutes, the ocean roared inland, submerging 326 km2 of Miyagi Prefecture, 67 km 2 of Fukushima, and 49 km 2 of Aomori Prefecture. As of June, the total death toll had reached 15,505, while approximately 5,300 people were injured, and 7,305 were reported as missing (National Police, 2011) . Thousands who lost their homes were temporarily housed in school gymnasiums and other public facilities with inadequate heating, food, and water (Fackler, 2011) . 2 The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was destroyed. At the time of this writing, the radiation was still leaking into the air and water and being carried to adjacent countries. The world, and perhaps especially neighboring China, watched in horror as the authorities attempted to estimate the long-term effects. This paper focuses on the raison d'étre for the ambitious program for expanding the country's nuclear power generation capacity adopted by the Chinese government and reviews the new plant construction targets it had set before the Japanese disaster. It then examines exactly what happened at Fukushima and investigates China's responses to date. This is followed by a discussion of unresolved issues surrounding China's rapid expansion of its nuclear power sector. The conclusion attempts to address whether or not nuclear power poses greater risks than other modes of power generation in China.
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NUCLEAR POWER IN CHINA'S ENERGY MIX
Following the launch of the country's economic reforms in 1978, China's economic growth has been among the highest in the world (on average >10 percent annually) and also the most sustained. The average annual growth rate of electricity consumption has necessarily been similarly high, a trend expected by many observers to continue. In its New Policies Scenario, the International Energy Agency has predicted that China's demand for power will grow at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent from 2008 to 2035, compared to 0.4 percent in the OECD and 1.6 for the world as a whole (IEA, 2010, Annex A) . 4 The expected demand is partly a function of some 8 million people still living without access to electricity, and partly due to projected population growth, the anticipated acquisition of more electrical equipment by households, as well as industrial and commercial growth (IEA, n.d.) . In recent decades, China's government has managed to completely electrify all cities and the vast bulk of rural areas, of which reportedly no more than one percent remained without power in 2008 (ibid.). In so doing, the government has constructed power plants and distribution systems on a scale unmatched in world history. By comparison, in 2008 there were still 404.5 million people living without electricity in India, 94.9 million in Bangladesh, and 81.1 in Indonesia (ibid.).
At present, 77 percent of the electricity generated in China comes from coal-fired power plants and 16.3 percent from hydropower. Oil leads the lesser tier of sources with 2.2 percent, followed by nuclear (1.8 percent), natural gas (1.7 percent), and wind and renewables (1.2 percent) (China Electricity Council, 2011) . As the country has abundant coal reserves (the third largest in the world), as early as 1949 the newly installed communist government did not hesitate to rely on coal to generate most of China's electricity. Subsequent administrations have also concurred that using coal is the least costly alternative as well as also the most secure in terms of energy independence. They have been loath to rely heavily on energy imports, fearing that this would put the country's economic growth and modernization at risk from external price shocks. Despite becoming a net coal importer in 2009, China is projected to continue its reliance on coal to generate most of the country's electrical power for the foreseeable future. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010) estimated in its New Policies Scenario that coal would account for 55 percent of China's total electricity generation in 2035.
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Although China is the world's fifth-largest producer of crude oil (BP, 2011, p. 8) , the country became a net importer in 1996 and is now the second-largest importer in the world, 3 The link between nuclear power development and nuclear weapons proliferation lies beyond the scope of the present paper. 4 The New Policies Scenario incorporates agreements made at the Copenhagen climate conference held in December 2009 and pledges made by the Group of 20 industrialized nations (G20) to phase out subsidies for fossil fuels production.
5 For additional information on China's coal sector, see Thomson (2003) , Huang (2009) , and Thomson and Horii (2009, pp. 654-655) .
after the United States (BP, 2011, p. 21) . The bulk of China's oil is consumed by the transport and petrochemical sectors. Use of natural gas for electricity generation has been relatively small, although this share is projected to increase quite substantially (see O'Hara and Lai, 2011) . While there are plans to dam more rivers and generate more hydropower, its share in the electricity generation mix is expected to decrease to 14 percent by 2035 (IEA, 2010) .
China is a world leader in the use of renewable forms of energy (excluding hydropower) to generate electricity. The country is the largest generator of wind energy in the world and among the largest producers of solar panels.
6 It is also devoting considerable resources to the development of biomass-fed power plants. Renewable forms of energy have made a very useful contribution to electrifying relatively sparsely populated areas of the country. However, they will not be able to produce sufficiently large quantities to power large cities and industrial conglomerations. While the various forms of renewable energy together (again excluding hydropower) now generate only slightly more than one percent of the total electricity generated, their share is expected to rise, so that biomass and waste alone are to account for 3 percent of the total power generated in 2035, wind for 7 percent, and solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrating solar power in aggregate for 1 percent (IEA, 2010, p. 670) .
There are at present 441 nuclear power reactors operating in 29 countries, with a combined capacity of over 376 gigawatts (GWe).
7 In 2010 they provided 2,360 terra watt-hours (TWh), or about 14 percent of the world's total electric power. Table 1 provides an overview of the current (i.e., as of mid-June 2011) and planned global nuclear power production. As many as 60 power reactors are currently being constructed in over a dozen countries, notably in China, South Korea, and Russia, with nearly one-half (43 percent) of these being built in China. The country's planned construction ("Reactors on Order or Planned" in Table 1 ) dwarfs that of any other single country and represents over one-third of the world's total planned capacity. In 2010, the output of electricity from China's nuclear power plants (NPPs) ranked ninth in the world. Yet within less than two decades (i.e., by 2030) China is expected to become the world's largest producer of nuclear power and to retain that position for years in the foreseeable future (WNA, 2011a).
CHINA'S RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING NUCLEAR POWER
One of the prime reasons motivating China's keen interest in NPPs is their capacity to produce large amounts of electricity without emitting large quantities of CO 2 and other greenhouse gases. Indeed, in order to meet their own carbon reduction targets and be seen by other countries as making a genuine effort to mitigate emissions, many governments had taken a position that reliance on nuclear power is their only viable option.
8 China is the largest emitter of CO 2 , followed by the United States, and its emissions are expected to grow more rapidly than in any other country. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China's share of coal-related emissions is expected to increase from 4.9 billion tons (bt) in 2006 to 9.3 in 2030, which is about 52 percent of the projected world total (WNA, 2011a) . In order to reduce the rate of emissions growth, the country's government has enunciated the goal of reducing carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent between 2005 and 2020. It is Operable reactors = connected to the grid; reactors under construction = first concrete for reactor poured, or major refurbishment under way; reactors planned or on order = approvals, and funding or major commitment in place (mostly expected in operation within 8-10 years); proposed reactors = specific program or site proposals (expected operation mostly within 15 years). known that enhanced energy efficiency can reduce emissions, i.e., lower the amount of fossil fuels consumed per unit of output. Accordingly, the government has just recently established another target aimed at reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 to 17 per cent by 2015 (China Aims, 2011) . A second reason behind the Chinese government's interest in nuclear power is its desire to be as self-sufficient in energy as possible. It already relies very heavily on imports of oil (see Leung et al., 2011) , 9 and as noted above, has recently also become a net importer of coal.
10 In addition to concerns about procurement of the necessary amounts of oil and coal from suppliers in international markets, there are rising fears about slowing global production and rising prices.
A third reason why China is interested in expanding its share of power generated by NPPs is the incredibly high accident rate in the country's small coal mines. China has always had large, government-run mines that use relatively efficient mining methods, but it also has thousands of small mines, many of which are illegal and use relatively primitive mining methods. For decades, thousands of lives have been lost each year in such mines, which often are operated by people who have little training in mine construction, operation, and safety. Most continue to function and produce coal, primarily because the demand for electricity is notoriously high. Reports about serious mining disasters are fairly frequent, with more than a few detailed in the international news media-an acute embarrassment to a country striving to become a superpower.
Thus, even before Fukushima, efforts to diversify away from coal and raise the share of nuclear power in China's energy mix were regarded by the leadership as matters no less important than national security. Nuclear proponents in the leadership were also motivated by economic considerations, for while the initial costs of building NPPs are high, the operating costs are relatively low, and each NPP can be expected to remain in service for at least 30 years (IAEA, 2007) .
THE EXISTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
There are presently 14 reactors in operation in China. All are situated in the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, with generating capacities ranging from 279 to 1037 megawatts (MWe) (see Table 2 and Fig. 1 ). As of June 2011, the total installed power generation capacity was 11,271 Mwe, which produced 71 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. The first two plants were built in the mid-1980s at Daya Bay near Hong Kong, and Qinshan south of Shanghai. The technology, largely of foreign origin, was imported from France, Canada, Russia, and the United States, and the plants began commercial operation in 1994. Eight of the current units now in operation were based on foreign design .
Plans for new capacity and approval of feasibility studies for new plants emanate from the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA). Three of the main organizations involved in the nuclear power business are the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPC), China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and the China Power Investment Corporation 9 For useful information see also Kambara and Howe (2007) , Wu and Zhang (2009), and BP (2010) . 10 The main reason why China began importing coal was that it was often less expensive to supply coastal provinces with coal by ship (from abroad) than via the country's overburdened rail system (from China's interior). Imported coal also tended to burn more cleanly, assisting China's efforts to meet carbon mitigation targets. Recently progress has been made in the technology of blending imported coals with China's domestic coals (often of high sulfur and fly ash content) so as to increase the efficiency and reduce emissions from the country's coal-fired plants (Bradsher, 2011b) .
(CPI). One of the country's regulatory bodies, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is also tasked with observing international agreements focused on safety. The State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) oversees the selection of technologies from foreign designers and suppliers.
Nuclear design engineers employed by the CNNC have developed pressurized water reactors (PWRs) with capacities of 300 MWe (CNP300), 600 MWe (CNP600), and 1,000 MWe (CNP1000); the latter was improved to produce the CP 1000, a China-made Generation II Plus (Gen-II+) design approved for export.
11 A more advanced design, the CPR-1000, was developed by CGNPG engineers on the basis of the French multinational corporation Areva's M310 reactor, and also classified as Generation II Plus (Wang Yichao et al., 2011 ). China's version, however, cannot be sold outside the country because Areva controls the intellectual property rights. Still another design of foreign origin, the AP1000 (categorized as Generation III) was obtained from the U.S.'s Westinghouse in 2007, and redesigned in China as a Generation III reactor called CAP1400.
China favors the AP1000 design as a prototype that conforms with Chinese experience in PWR design, construction, and management as well as with the current trend abroad to build Generation III reactors. With key safety features, it was also found to be cost effective, and relatively easy to build and operate. It is noteworthy that the United States has selected the AP1000 design for at least 14 of its 28 proposed reactors. Most NPPs have one of two types of PWRs, namely light water reactors (LWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs) (WNA, 2010a). Generation I reactors, mostly using natural uranium fuel and graphite as a moderator, were developed during the 1950s and 1960s, so that very few are still active in 2011. Generation II reactors, many in operation in the U.S. and elsewhere, typically use enriched uranium fuel and are cooled and moderated by water. The most advanced Generation III reactors with enhanced safety installations (the first few already in operation in Japan) are in advanced stages of construction (WNA, 2011c) . Projected designs classified as Generation IV, with closed fuel cycles and capability to burn the actinides that presently form a part of spent fuel, are still on the drawing board and not expected to be operational before 2020 (ibid.).
12 Other Generation III reactor designs used in China are AREVA's EPR and Russia's VVER. 
NPP CONSTRUCTION PLANS (PRE-FUKUSHIMA)
As there were no serious accidents at any of China's NPPs during in the 1990s, the country's government was sufficiently confident in its use of nuclear power to initiate calls for major expansion of this sector in the 10th Five Year Plan (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . 13 Then in the 11th FYP (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , it re-inforced its confidence by announcing that the country would begin to develop Generation-III plants. The "Medium and Long-term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005-2020) ," approved in March 2006 stated that China's nuclear capacity would reach about 40 GWe by 2020. However, as of June 2010, the official targets were raised to 70-80 GWe of installed capacity by 2020, to 200 GWe by 2030, and 400-500 GWe by 2050. In 2011, the official revised target for 2020 is 86 GWe (Zheng and Mao, 2009 ). Yet, overall, given that the other forms of power generation capacity will also continue to expand, China's nuclear power still will account for no more than 4 to 5 percent of the total generation mix.
At present, there are 26 reactors under construction (Table 1) . In an attempt to develop and modernize the country's central and western regions, many of the planned reactors are to be situated in inland locations. Of the 26 reactors, 19 are of Chinese design (CPR-1000; Yun, 2011, p. 773) . Another 34 (36.9 GWe) reactors, predominantly based on CPR-1000 and AP1000 designs, have been approved (WNA, 2011a), including units planned for sites located in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Fujian, Shandong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui. 14 Many of the NPPs under construction in 2011 and approved for construction in the future are Generation-II PWRs. Some Chinese specialists worry that these may become outdated, and believe that the country should delay its construction of Generation II plants and concentrate instead on providing more Generation-III PWRs. Based on the target of installed capacity, they envisage the CAP1400 (see above) as the mainstay of China's nuclear industry in 2020.
Using mainly German and Russian technologies and designs, China is currently building its first Generation-IV high-temperature gas-cooled pebble bed (HTR-PM) reactor NPP at Rongcheng in Shandong Province. 15 This 210 MW pilot plant will use helium (an inert gas) in its cooling system so that reactor cores would be able to withstand temperatures >1,600° C for several hundred hours without melting down. Cooling will be completely independent of external power sources, and the plant is scheduled to start feeding electricity to the national power grid in 2013 (Sethuraman and Rakteem, 2011) .
The plant was designed and constructed by a team affiliated with Tsinghua University, which received government funding to cover all research and 30 percent of the construction costs. After evidence confirming successful operation of the pilot plant, the Huaneng Shandong Shidaowan Nuclear Power Company (HSSNPC) joint venture between Huaneng Nuclear Power Development Company and the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC) plans to build commercial HTR-PM plants on the same site (First Steps, 2009 ). Germany, South Africa and the United States have all experimented with HTR-PM technology, but have encountered technical and/or financial difficulties (Carré et al., 2009; Bradsher, 2011a; China 2010 MWe, 2011 .
In 2010, China's first experimental fast neutron reactor (FNR) near Beijing went critical (i.e., achieved a stable, self-sustaining reaction). Using a fraction of the uranium fuel that Generation III reactors use, FNRs are fundamental to the Generation IV technology that 13 Since the early 1950s when the People's Republic of China was being assisted by the Soviet Union, the government has drawn up five-year national plans, which stipulate targets for economic and sectoral growth.
14 Even more are under consideration for Jiangsu, Guangdong, Sichuan, Hubei, Shandong, Hainan, Hunan, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Anhui, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Jilin, Gansu, Hebei, Fujian, and Heilongjiang. 15 Pebble bed technology involves the use of hundreds of thousands of graphite balls about the size of billiard balls. In the core of each are a few grains of uranium. The balls are designed to be impregnable, and to withstand high heat, moisture and pressure (China 210 MWe, 2011).
China plans to introduce by developing an indigenous 1000 MWe design, scheduled to be completed by 2022.
With work on sophisticated engineering designs under way, China was not really prepared to halt its rapidly growing nuclear power program as a result of the massive disaster on the eastern coast of nearby Japan. Yet there might have been some apprehension among the leadership in Beijing after the news first emerged. But what was actually happening at Fukushima?
WHAT HAPPENED AT FUKUSHIMA
In order to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, Japan began generating nuclear power in 1973, and was the third-largest nuclear power producer in the world after the United States and France in 2010 (Table 1) . Its 51 reactors produced 29.2 per cent of the country's electricity in 2010 (WNA, 2011d).
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, constructed in stages between 1971 and 1979, housed six boiling-(or light-) water reactors (BWR). Consequently, the oldest reactor at the plant had passed the 40-year threshold and the others were soon to do so. 16 On March 11, 2011, reactors 4, 5, and 6 happened to be shut down for maintenance. Following the earthquake and tsunami, units 1, 2 and 3 instantly ceased operating (Grimston, 2011) .
Although the seawall protecting the plant was designed to withstand a 20-foot tsunami, the March 11 wave measured higher than 30 feet. Located squarely on the coastline, the reactors and back-up diesel generators were flooded, causing the fission process to stop immediately. The diesel tanks in fact were washed away. Emergency batteries worked for a short while before going flat. When all reactors completely lost both offsite and onsite power, the auxiliary cooling systems failed and all three reactors suffered meltdowns. Due to inadequate cooling, a hydrogen explosion took place at Unit 3. The critical problem leading to the disaster was the loss of power. It should be noted that although the safety and backup systems in each unit were designed to handle earthquakes measuring only 8.0 on the Richter scale, all continued to function exactly as they should in the devastating 9.0 quake (WNA, 2009a; Hayashi and Iwata, 2011) .
At the end of March there was still no electricity in the immediate region. It was expected that power rationing would be in effect in eastern Japan until the end of April, and even for some time longer in the northeast. Rolling blackouts affected households, businesses, and educational institutions across the country and many train services, highways, and ports were out of action.
Seawater tested near the plant was found to contain levels of iodine-131, a short-lived radioactive isotope typically present in large quantities following nuclear explosions and power plant meltdowns, exceeding the safety standard by as much as 3,355 times. Following a series of major aftershocks and the discovery that more radiation than previously estimated had leaked from the plant soon after March 11, Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) raised the severity level of this disaster from level 5 (the same classification assigned to the partial reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979) to level 7 (the classification given to the Chernobyl Incident in 1986; Tanglao, 2011) .
It is important to note that the Fukushima crisis was the result of a natural disaster, whereas Chernobyl and Three Mile Island were caused by human error. The thousands of deaths and casualties that occurred near Fukushima were not due to radiation, but rather to the devastating force of the earthquake and tsunami. At Chernobyl, 31 died directly as a result of the incident and some 4,000 people suffered thyroid cancer (though almost all were treated successfully), and there was extensive damage to surrounding land (WNA, n.d.; Marples, 2004) . The Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania, which by comparison caused significantly less damage, resulted in no deaths or injuries.
While at the time of writing in mid-June 2011, the total amount of radioactive material released at Fukushima was equivalent to only ca. 10 percent of that released after the Chernobyl disaster, officials at the Tohoku Electric Power Company (TEPCO) feared that the afflicted plant might ultimately release more radiation than Chernobyl (Reuters, 2011c) . TEPCO employees were still pumping enormous quantities of water to cool the three reactors and storing the water in an improvised storage facility, which was recently discovered to be leaking. Thousands of tons of highly radioactive water have ponded at the bottom of the building housing the reactors and in ditches near the plant. TEPCO intends to bring all reactors to a stable "cold shutdown" between October 2011 and January 2012. Total damage is still being assessed, although the Japanese government has indicated that costs already exceed $300 billion (Reuters, 2011a) . It should be noted that the disaster affected not only the Fukushima NPP but also many ports, steel mills, oil refineries, automobile plants, shipyards, and electronic components manufacturers (BBC, 2011b; Webb, 2011) .
RESPONSES TO FUKUSHIMA
As expected, the disaster prompted anxious reactions and offers of help from numerous countries (including China), which immediately sent millions of dollars worth of aid and assistance to Japan. Many lauded the Japanese for their courage and stamina in dealing with the grim aftermath. Soon after March 11, the Chinese government announced its intent to suspend the approval of new nuclear power stations and strengthen its safety standards until final enactment of the Atomic Energy Act.
18 It also ordered an assessment of safety risks at plants under construction and a strengthening of the management of safety procedures at plants already in operation.
In the days and weeks that followed the Japanese disaster, Chinese government officials continuously reiterated that safety was their utmost concern. The authorities began to announce radiation levels in 42 cities, and until the government confirmed that China would not be seriously exposed to radiation leakages, there was panic in some cities. Many Chinese households hoarded salt in the false belief that it could prevent the harmful effects of radiation (Reuters, 2011b) . Very concerned about the contamination of agricultural products and the flow of seawater containing radioactive materials into China, the government worked closely with NISA to minimize the consequences not only for China but also for other countries in the adjacent region. In May, the director of China's State Oceanic Administration proposed that nine countries in the South China Sea Region establish a tsunami warning system that could track a tsunami within 10 minutes of a quake under the seabed (Wang Qian, 2011) .
Before the Fukushima disaster, Chinese authorities did not openly discuss the country's own NPPs in the media. However, the events in Japan prompted wide coverage in China's newspapers as well as other media such as state radio and television. Not only are the two countries in geographical proximity, but there is a large Chinese community living in Japan, comprising both students and individuals working in that country. The Chinese public quickly became more aware of what is entailed in building and operating NPPs, and the new forms of electronic media such as the Internet began to scrutinize China's own nuclear power program as never before. Many urban dwellers, hitherto without any opinion about nuclear power, were suddenly discussing the advantages and limitations in great detail, questioning the authorities' abilities to manage the relatively large and complex nuclear power development program in the country. Collectively, Internet users began to press the authorities to provide more information about the construction and operation of China's existing and planned NPPs (e.g., see Tatlow, 2011) .
Thus far, the Chinese government has not backed down from its ambitious nuclear power program. The leadership is aware that the demand for electricity will continue to grow very rapidly over the coming decades, and believes that although the events at Fukushima were indeed tragic, they were the result of a natural disaster rather than of failure of the nuclear power technology. Local governments are still very keen to build more NPPs because the availability of additional electricity would attract more industry, and in turn generate additional investment and jobs.
In other areas of Asia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia have indicated that they will continue their own development plans.
19 Likewise India announced it would examine all of its reactors but would not halt its plans to construct new NPPs. 20 Only Thailand declared that all plans for nuclear power would be halted until officials had examined emergency measures (and also the potential of nuclear plants to become targets of terrorist assaults).
In Europe, the EU Energy Commissioner called for a reassessment of the 27-nation grouping's nuclear power plant policy. The EU's 143 nuclear reactors are to undergo rigorous tests to see how well they can withstand earthquakes and other major calamities, with the understanding that plants that fail the stress tests will be shut down (Harrison, 2011a) . In addition to the EU's call for stress tests, all of France's 58 nuclear reactors will undergo studies to confirm their ability to withstand earthquakes and floods; Spain, Russia, and the UK have ordered similar safety reviews (Harrison, 2011b; Willsher, 2011) .
Germany, Switzerland, and Italy differ from other European countries by reacting more radically to the disaster at Fukushima. The Swiss authorities have suspended nuclear plant construction, and Germany's coalition government agreed to shut down all of the country's nuclear reactors by 2022 (Willsher, 2011) . Seventeen are presently in operation, generating over a quarter of Germany's total electricity, although seven were closed temporarily immediately after the Fukushima disaster. Nuclear power has been a highly controversial issue there for several years, and Chancellor Angela Merkel was forced in March 2011 to backtrack on a 19 Vietnam is planning eight plants producing some 16,000 Mw by 2030 (Asia, 2011), Malaysia anticipates completion of its first nuclear power plant by 2021, while Indonesia projects the construction of four plants producing 6,000 MW by 2025 (WNA, 2011d). Many inhabitants of that country, as well as of neighboring states, are seriously concerned, given Indonesia's reputation for lax regulatory measures, inadequate disaster management systems, and susceptibility to corruption (Amir, 2010) .
20 India produced 20.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity generated by the countgry's NPPs in 2010, and now has 20 reactors in operation and five under construction (WNA, 2011d). The government expects to have 20,000 MWe of nuclear capacity on line by 2020 and 63,000 by 2032. A target has been set for 2050 to supply 25 percent of the country's total electricity output from nuclear power (WNA, 2011b). decision made only a few months earlier to extend the life of some of the country's reactors. The Italians had dropped reliance on nuclear energy after a 1987 referendum following the Chernobyl disaster. When Prime Minister Silvio Burlusconi recently resurrected the idea of using nuclear power, Italian voters soundly defeated the proposal in a June 2011 referendum (BBC, 2011a) .
In the United States, President Barack Obama ordered a comprehensive review of the domestic nuclear safety by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to be completed within six months (Reuters, 2011d) . And in Venezuela, plans to construct the country's first nuclear power plant were immediately halted in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN CHINA'S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR POWER
Among the major unresolved issues in China's nuclear power sector are the lack of workers with proper training, insufficient production of domestic uranium, disposal of spent fuel, inadequate safety, and lastly lack of transparency and corruption.
Insufficient Numbers of Workers with Proper Training
Following the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents in 1979 and 1986, many countries put their plans for nuclear power on hold. Academic departments cut relevant courses and young people opted to conduct research on other forms of energy. Around the world, the nuclear power industry currently employs about 250,000 people, a large share of whom will be retiring in the next decade. Following the nuclear hiatus of the 1980s and 1990s, a generation of workers has been lost. The 30-year-olds who now enter the industry worldwide after many years of schooling generally do not have the same level of hands-on experience and training as their predecessors (Choi, 2010; Nuclear, 2010; Staffing, 2011) . In China, not unlike elsewhere, insufficient numbers of people with proper training could seriously jeopardize nuclear power development plans as well.
During the 1950s, Soviet scientific and technological assistance inculcated a strong emphasis on nuclear technology in China's universities. The Chinese endeavored to sustain this emphasis during the 1960s, but most if not all programs were disrupted in 1966 when the country began to experience the turbulent and destructive policies of the Cultural Revolution. Many key scientific programs, including those in nuclear engineering, disintegrated, but were revived by the early years of the reform era. In 2004, the major nuclear engineering programs at Chinese universities admitted roughly 372 undergrads and 145 graduate students. However, only about 30 percent of those remained in the field (Guo, 2004) . At present, the government is mounting a concerted effort to sharply expand enrollments in nuclear engineering. According to one of the estimates, China will need 6,000 nuclear engineering professionals to staff the NPPs planned to be in operation by 2020 (Li and Deng, 2006) . Filling such a large number of positions could be problematic, and many observers wonder if China will be able to deal with a meltdown or significant radiation leakage (e.g., see Bo, 2011; Decker, 2011) .
Insufficient Production of Domestic Uranium
One of the prerequisites to a successful program for the development of nuclear energy facilities is ready access to uranium. Global requirements of uranium are presently estimated at almost 69,000 tons per year (see Table 1 ). If a single 1 GWe (1000 MWe) PWR consumes roughly 169.45 to 190.11 tons of U per year, China would need 7500-8000 tons each year to meet its 40 GWe capacity target (Yang and Huang, 2010, p. 966) . According to another estimate, 9,814 to 10,349 tons would be needed to meet this target (Qiang, 2009 , pp. 2488 , quoting Wang et al., 2005 . Cumulative demand to 2020 is estimated at 89,992 to 91,364 tons, but domestic supply amounts to only 31,800 tons.
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While China's annual production of uranium in recent years has averaged about 750 tons, its demand is estimated at over 4,000 tons per year (WNA, 2011d) . Although some 200 small to medium-sized deposits have been discovered in China to date, most are of low grade and generally located in remote areas as well as within structures that are difficult to mine (Yang and Huang, 2010, p. 971) . However, they have not as yet been fully explored, either horizontally and vertically. Prior to 2008, CNNC was the only company permitted to explore for uranium deposits in the country, but private-sector organizations are also now permitted to explore and process uranium (China Releases, 2008) . A report on Chinamining. org (Beijing, 2007) claims that CNNC is the main uranium miner on the mainland, although China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding (the smaller of the two state producers) also set up a mining company in August 2006.
Without sufficient domestically produced uranium, China has become involved in the exploration and production of uranium in many other countries (Jiang, 2010, p. 157) . Trade agreements have been signed with producers in Australia, Kazakhstan, and Canada, 22 and Areva of France has also pledged to supply uranium. Although the availability and diversity of supply may reassure Chinese importers, one of their main concerns is the cost of uranium. Uranium oxide (U 3 O 8 ) is now considerably more expensive than when the country built its first NPP in the early 1990s, rising from about $10 per pound in 2002 to $95 in 2007 (Larter, 2007) , although in the aftermath of Fukushima it has hovered around $60 (Index Mundi, n.d).
Disposal of Spent Fuel
The permanent disposal of NPP wastes is an unresolved problem throughout the world. It is estimated that by 2020, China at a minimum will generate about 983 tons of spent fuel annually. At present, spent fuel is delivered to the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex, which should eventually be able to handle 100 tons per year; disposal facilities also exist in the Guangxi Autonomous Region (Qiang, 2009 (Qiang, , p. 2490 . And in November 2010, CNNC signed an agreement with Areva to build (by 2025) a reprocessing plant capable of handling 800 tons of spent fuel annually in Jinta (Gansu Province). Much of China's spent fuel is stored at least temporarily in tanks on site at NPPs, as at Fukushima where radiation-emitting fuel rods were at the core of the crisis (Spegele, 2011) .
Some observers (Zhou and Zhang, 2010; Zhou, 2011) have voiced another concern: because construction of new disposal facilities in China lags behind the construction of new NPPs, inadequate fuel disposal capacity could become a serious bottleneck in national plans to increase reliance on nuclear power. Nonetheless, China does have the advantage of being an expansive country with immense tracts of sparsely populated land. Following Russia's lead in this regard, it has even been mooted that China could create a new and sizable source of income by storing the nuclear wastes of other countries. However, the storage of nuclear wastes does not necessarily guarantee permanent disposal in a secure and environmentally responsible manner. No less problematic are plans to reprocess spent fuel that may endanger nuclear nonproliferation efforts (Spegele, 2011) .
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Corruption and Lack of Safety
The speed at which China's main cities have grown since the economic reforms were launched in 1978 and rapid development of thousands of new cities have been quite remarkable. However, the construction industry is known to be among the country's most corrupt. Daily news media are filled with stories of doufu buildings that are "soft" and fall apart soon after completion, of serious accidents caused by contractors' purchases of less expensive, substandard materials, or of theft of materials from building sites.
Many observers in China and elsewhere fear a miscalculation or omission in the construction of NPPs, or a security/maintennance lapse in their operation. The problem could be exacerbated by the large number of plants under construction, and the speed at which they are being built. Another concern is that coal-fired power plant building companies and contractors will become increasingly involved in the construction of NPPs. Coal-fired and nuclear power plants are very different in their use of materials and design, and the CAEA and NNSA will have to carefully monitor NPP construction sites to ensure that building codes are enforced and appropriate construction techniques employed (Winning, 2010) .
In this context, lack of transparency is another major problem in China, where news about accidents traced to gross negligence that may embarrass the government is often not published (Ching, 2011) . Lastly, the safety culture at many of the country's construction sites is known to be not as fully developed as in the Western world.
DISCUSSION
China's power requirements over the next few decades are known to be immense and there is therefore no possibility of exclusive reliance on renewable sources of energy in the foreseeable future. Solar and wind installations function only intermittently and cannot be relied upon for baseload electricity generation. In the face of recurring droughts, possibly brought on by climate change, current and planned hydropower projects are in potential jeopardy, while battery technologies that would allow storage of large quantities of electricity are still many years away. The country thus has no choice but to continue its reliance on fossil fuels, notably coal, to generate electricity, and to an extent conventional natural gas will play a larger role. 24 Eager to mitigate carbon emissions as much as possible, China is already taking a strong lead in carbon capture and storage technologies. On the basis of these developments, it can be expected that China's emissions will eventually plateau and perhaps even taper off slowly, but not fall precipitously. In view of the above, it can be argued that nuclear energy is the most efficient and environmentally friendly way for China to generate large quantities of electricity.
Protecting NPPs from disastrous events such as those at Fukushima is a compelling concern. No country can be completely immune from the forces of nature, and there are times when there can be scarcely a warning. However, in the case of earthquakes and tsunamis, scientists can determine where fault lines lie and where tsunamis are likely to hit. Like Japan, China does experience frequent earthquakes, often very severe ones, but nuclear power plants can be built well away from vulnerable sites. Moreover, cooling designs at newer plants are quite different from those installed in the relatively old Fukushima reactors. Generation-III reactors have passive cooling systems that use gravity instead of electricity to operate. Also, at the newer plants the spent fuel ponds are situated some distance away from the reactors and at lower elevations, making them easier to fill. Another safety feature of some of China's newer plants is a series of barriers between the radioactive reactor core and the environment (WNA, 2011a) .
Following Fukushima, all new NPPs worldwide will be fitted with a power system that, in one way or another, cannot fail, and all countries will begin to carry out more safety inspections before and during the course of construction (as well as after). Thus, although China's enhanced reliance on nuclear power will come with its own set of risks, it is not unreasonable to assume that another Fukushima is rather unlikely to occur.
Apart from Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, 25 there have been no serious nuclear power plant failures anywhere in the world since nuclear power was widely adopted in the 1960s. Both of these incidents were the result of human error and provide important lessons in nuclear safety and the hazards of power plant operation. By comparison, for over a century thousands of people have died each year in coal mines, as well as in the extraction and combustion of other fossil fuels.
There is still a great deal that China can and should do to make its NPPs safer. An encouraging outcome of the Fukushima disaster is that China's aforementioned Atomic Energy Act is to be finally revised and probably enacted. Moreover, the Chinese public is much more aware now of how nuclear power plants operate, as well as of the multi-faceted decisionmaking procedures that need to be involved. Furthermore, there is now heightened scepticism regarding nuclear power plants, and national and local governments may be compelled to provide more details to the public about safety standards, operations, decommissioning, storage, or reprocessing of spent fuel.
As this paper went to press, China was facing its worst power shortages since 2004 and the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Supply was shrinking daily while the approach of summer was sharply increasing the demand for air conditioning; some towns were receiving electricity only twice per week (e.g., see Chinese Provinces, 2011; Sainsbury, 2011) . The situation reflects the worst drought in 50 years, which has meant less hydropower being generated, and also the utility companies' refusal to produce power due to the high price of coal. More specifically, while the price of coal has been deregulated (allowing it to rise sharply), the price power companies can charge remains fixed in an effort to control inflation. The utility companies, unable to pass on the higher coal costs to electricity consumers, have been absorbing very substantial financial losses (Rising Coal, 2011) .
Clearly, there remain fundamental problems in the administration of electricity supply in China. With respect to the country's nuclear energy program, the government must not only ensure the safe construction and operation of existing and planned NPPs, but also introduce financial logic to underpin these activities. As a result of the Fukushima disaster, with enhanced inspection procedures and monitoring at every stage of NPP construction and operation, the costs of electricity to Chinese citizens are expected to rise. Arguably, however, the long-run costs of nuclear-generated electricity to China's environment and society will likely be lower than if the county's nuclear development program were to be abandoned.
